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EMPLOYMENT CASES IN ALASKA:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
TERRY A. VENNEBERG*
In this Comment, the author critiques a proposed model for the
use in employment cases of evidence of employee misconduct ac-
quired after the employee’s discipline or dismissal on other
grounds.  The author argues that the model fails to address con-
cerns about possible employer abuse of the rule allowing intro-
duction of such after-acquired evidence.  The author recommends
an alternative approach in which employee wrongdoing must be
severe and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
which uses the date of discovery of the wrongdoing as the cutoff
for damages, and which prohibits any use of evidence of employee
misconduct engaged in after the employee’s termination.
I.  INTRODUCTION
This Comment will address the points and arguments made in
the recent article, A Brief Analysis of After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Cases: A Proposed Model for Alaska (and Points
South).1  In the article, the author suggests that, when it next faces
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the issue, the Alaska Supreme Court should adopt new rules for
the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in employ-
ment cases.  The author contends that the initial approach to after-
acquired evidence offered by the Court, as set out in Brogdon v.
City of Klawock,2 “conflicts with existing legal principles, repre-
sents questionable policy, and needlessly fosters confusion in an al-
ready complicated area of law.”3
As this Comment will illustrate, it is the author’s proposed ap-
proach to after-acquired evidence (“the Model”) that would con-
flict with existing legal principles, implement questionable policy,
and needlessly foster confusion in this area of the law.  This Com-
ment will examine the proposed Model, describe how it fails to ad-
dress concerns that have been expressed regarding the after-
acquired evidence doctrine, and recommend an approach to after-
acquired evidence in Alaska that takes into account those con-
cerns.
II.  THE MODEL’S APPROACH TO AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
The Model’s author notes that “[a]fter-acquired evidence is
evidence independent of employee misconduct that the employer
discovers after it has already disciplined the employee on different
grounds.”4  Typically, an employer will raise the “after-acquired
evidence” defense in the following scenario: an employee who has
been dismissed alleges that his termination was either contrary to a
specific provision of law or in breach of the employment contract.
The employer, during the course of litigation concerning the dis-
missal, discovers evidence of alleged misconduct by the employee
during that person’s employment.  The employer then claims that,
even if the dismissal at issue in the case is found to be wrongful or
illegal, the employee would have been dismissed anyway, in light of
the discovery of the alleged misconduct.  The employer goes on to
assert that it cannot be held liable for the termination, or any dam-
ages stemming from the termination, because of the “after-
acquired evidence” that it has identified.
The Model incorporates several suggestions concerning the
use of after-acquired evidence in employment cases.  First, the
Model seeks a definition of after-acquired evidence that would not
take into account the “significance or materiality” of the conduct in
question.5  In order to use after-acquired evidence as a defense, the
2. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
3. Fisher, supra note 1, at 274.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 288.
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employer would be required to establish only that the conduct
would warrant a “disciplinary action” of some type.6  The employer
would not be required, under this approach, to prove that the em-
ployee conduct constituted a terminable offense; the employer
would be required to show only that the conduct was in some way a
violation of employer rules.7
Second, the Model would not require that an employer actu-
ally prove that the employee engaged in the misconduct alleged.
The employer would be required to prove only that it had a “good
faith belief” that the employee engaged in the conduct in question.8
This good faith belief may be “based on facts supported by sub-
stantial evidence.”9  Under this approach, the credibility of wit-
nesses and evidence could not be tested.  If one person gave a
statement that the employee engaged in the misconduct or rules
violation, and numerous others gave a statement to the contrary,
the employer could claim “good faith belief” in the validity of the
charge based on the single statement and offer the incident as af-
ter-acquired evidence.
The author also advances the position that “[a]fter-acquired
evidence should bar suit in all wrongful termination cases except
those alleging employment discrimination or civil rights claims.”10
This position is based primarily on the equitable and contractual
nature of the employment relationship and the argument that no
employee should be allowed to claim breach of contract where the
employee has been shown to have “unclean hands” or to have con-
cealed misconduct from the employer.11  The author goes on, how-
ever, to state that suit should not be barred in all cases where after-
acquired evidence is offered, distinguishing between cases where
there is evidence that “may relate to misconduct which leads to an
outcome less severe than termination,” and evidence that would
support a termination.12  In the former situation, the after-acquired
evidence “should bar prospective relief and limit the employee’s
remedy to damages between the date of wrongful discipline . . . and
the date when the employee actually committed the misconduct
related to the after-acquired evidence.”13
6. See id. at 289.
7. See id. at 288-90.
8. Id. at 289.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 290.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id.  Under this approach, ludicrous results could emerge.  For example, if
the employer discovers during the litigation that the employee was late for work
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The author also argues for application of a “preponderance of
evidence” standard to the after-acquired evidence defense, as op-
posed to a “clear and convincing evidence” test, claiming that there
is no indication that such a heightened level of proof is needed.14
The author adds that “[s]ome commentators, apparently under the
assumption that any decision by an employer is inherently pretex-
tual, have suggested an analysis that effectively would impose a
clear and convincing standard of proof on employers. . . . No study,
empirical or otherwise, has established that employers use after-
acquired evidence in an impermissible manner.”15
Finally, the Model posits that evidence of post-termination
misconduct should be admissible as after-acquired evidence.16  The
author notes that “[i]t is difficult to see how post-discipline mis-
conduct is not relevant and should not be admissible because such
misconduct directly relates to an employee’s potential remedies.”17
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL’S APPROACH
The primary difficulty with the proposed Model for applica-
tion of the after-acquired evidence rule is that it fails, on several
levels, to address the concerns expressed by the Alaska Supreme
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court regarding potential abuses as-
sociated with this defense.  Virtually no safeguards are provided in
the Model to protect against enthusiastic overuse of the defense by
employers in almost every conceivable case where wrongful termi-
nation has been alleged.  The proposed Model essentially would
provide for self-immunization by employers against wrongful ter-
mination claims, turning almost any transgression of employer
rules, actual or perceived, into a basis for dismissal of such claims.
No court that has considered application of the after-acquired evi-
dence rule has offered such facile treatment of concerns associated
with the defense.
Any analysis of the after-acquired evidence rule in Alaska
must begin with the decision in Brogdon v. City of Klawock.18  In
that case, the City of Klawock had issued a supplemental termina-
tion notice stating new grounds for terminating Brogdon from his
once several years before his or her termination, and that single incident subjected
the employee to some lesser disciplinary action than termination, the employer
could introduce that evidence and argue that the employee’s entire damages claim
be dismissed.
14. See id. at 291-92.
15. Id. at 293-94.
16. See id. at 294-95.
17. Id. at 295.
18. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
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employment.19  The trial court held that the after-acquired evidence
in support of the City’s supplemental termination notice could be
admitted only if it was evidence that the City reasonably could
have discovered had Brogdon not been terminated.20  The City ap-
pealed, claiming that the trial court’s ruling concerning the after-
acquired evidence was “legally unsupportable.”21
The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the limitation imposed
by the trial court on the use of after-acquired evidence had been
erroneous.  Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,22 the court held that the discov-
ery of “grave misconduct on the part of a terminated employee,”
which might have been concealed had the employee not been ter-
minated, should excuse the employer from either reinstating the
employee or paying prospective damages in a wrongful termination
action.23  The court also noted the legitimate concerns expressed by
Brogdon concerning the possible pretextual nature of the after-
acquired evidence the defendant sought to have admitted.24  The
court wrote that
[a]fter-the-fact justifications should be viewed with skepticism.
It might be appropriate to fashion a rule that no post-
termination justification should serve to limit damages unless it
is one which all reasonable employers would regard as mandat-
ing termination and which is, as a matter of law, just cause for
termination. Other safeguards against after-the-fact pretextual
justifications such as imposing a heightened burden of proof are
also possible.  However, these questions are not before us.25
Similar concerns about potential abuse of the after-acquired
evidence rule were cited by Justice Kennedy in McKennon.  In that
case, the Court held that after-acquired evidence in an action under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not serve as a
basis for dismissal of the case, but could serve to limit the damages
recoverable in such a claim: “The beginning point in the trial
court’s formulation of a remedy should be calculation of backpay
from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new infor-
mation was discovered.”26  The Court went on to state that
[w]here an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence
of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of
19. See id. at 991.
20. See id. at 991-92.
21. Id. at 992.
22. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
23. Brogdon, 930 P.2d at 992.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
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such severity that the employee in fact would have been termi-
nated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at
the time of the discharge.  The concern that employers might as
a routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an em-
ployee’s background or performance on the job to resist claims
under the Act is not an insubstantial one.27
The concerns expressed in Brogdon and McKennon are no-
where reflected in the proposed Model.  The author simply dis-
misses any thought of employer abuse of the rule with the state-
ment that “[n]o study, empirical or otherwise, has established that
employers use after-acquired evidence in an impermissible man-
ner.”28  The absence of a study in this area, however, cannot serve
to outweigh both judicial worries about abuses of the after-
acquired evidence rule and the shared experience of practitioners
in the field of employment law.  It borders on the naive to suggest
that employers do not or would not actively search for information
upon which to make a claim that the employee who sues for wrong-
ful termination would have been fired anyway.  Any approach
adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court for consideration of after-
acquired evidence should take into account the concerns already
expressed in Brogdon and McKennon and should have safeguards
built in to ensure that no claim under the rule is easily advanced or
proved.
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO APPLICATION OF THE
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE RULE
A. Application of the McKennon Standard
The approach outlined in McKennon should be applied to all
cases where the employer seeks to invoke the after-acquired evi-
dence rule.  Under McKennon, an employer would be required to
establish, prior to relying on after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing
as a defense, “that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the
employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds
alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the dis-
charge.”29  If the employer were to meet this burden, the impact of
the after-acquired evidence would be directed to the remedy af-
forded to the employee, rather than to the employee’s right to
maintain an action: “The beginning point in the trial court’s for-
mulation of a remedy should be calculation of backpay from the
27. Id. at 362-63.
28. Fisher, supra note 1, at 294.
29. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63.
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date of unlawful discharge to the date the new information was dis-
covered.”30
Application of the test set out in McKennon is appropriate on
several grounds.  First, McKennon was the case principally relied
upon by the Alaska Supreme Court in Brogdon as the leading case
concerning the after-acquired evidence rule.  Second, the McKen-
non standard builds in several protections against employer abuse
of the after-acquired evidence rule.  It would require that any after-
acquired evidence offered reveal misconduct sufficiently severe to
have justified termination, not just some unspecified disciplinary
action.  It would require that the employer prove that the em-
ployee actually engaged in the wrongdoing alleged, as opposed to
simply proving a good faith belief that he or she had done so.31
These requirements would make it difficult for an employer to in-
voke the after-acquired evidence rule simply on a “belief” that an
employee had, at one time during employment, violated some rule
of the employer.
In McKennon, the Court held that after-acquired evidence
should be directed to the remedy afforded the employee, rather
than the liability of the employer for the wrongful act.32  The
Model’s author suggests that this analysis should not be applicable
to wrongful termination cases because public policy is not impli-
cated.33  In fact, public policy is implicated in most, if not all, cases
where wrongful termination has been claimed.  Breaches of con-
tract and tortious conduct constitute violations of the common law.
In Weissman v. Crawford Rehabilitation Services,34 the court dis-
cussed application of McKennon to a tort claim for wrongful dis-
charge, holding that after-acquired evidence could not be used to
dismiss the claim, but rather could be used only to limit the rem-
edy.35  The court rejected the dichotomy between employment dis-
30. Id. at 362.
31. A succinct statement of the test to be applied may be found in Bullock v.
Balis & Co., No. CIV.A. 99-748, 2000 WL 1858719, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2000),
where the court noted that “[b]efore an employer can invoke the after-acquired
evidence doctrine, it must prove that: (1) the employee actually committed the
misconduct; and (2) the employer in fact would have terminated the employee on
those grounds alone if it had discovered the wrongdoing.”
32. See id at 360-62. This concept was expressed best by Judge Fletcher of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir.
1996), where he stated that “[after-acquired] evidence’s only benefit to the em-
ployer is to limit the extent of the remedy.”
33. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 279.
34. 914 P.2d 380 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
35. See id. at 386.
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crimination and wrongful termination cases for purposes of public
policy significance, stating that “the very considerations which led
the judiciary of this state to recognize the tort of wrongful dis-
charge compel the conclusion that the public policies that are pres-
ent in such cases are no less important than those that are recog-
nized by legislation.”36  In short, there is no reason to treat
statutory claims differently from claims brought under the common
law for purposes of applying McKennon.
Similarly, on application of the after-acquired evidence rule,
there is no reason why the date of discovery of the misconduct
should not be the cutoff for damages, as opposed to the date on
which the misconduct took place.  The Model’s author argues that
the “date of discovery” approach as adopted in McKennon “re-
wards a deceptive employee” for concealing misconduct.37  This
analysis assumes that the employee is aware that the conduct at is-
sue constitutes a terminable offense.  It assumes that the employee
has “concealed” the conduct in an effort to enhance damages in a
wrongful termination action, which makes little sense when viewed
in the practical reality of employment litigation.  The “date of dis-
covery” rule is appropriate because the date on which misconduct
is discovered is the date upon which an employee would be termi-
nated for the offense.  Employers do not terminate employees ef-
fective as of an earlier date, based on a claim that the conduct had
been concealed.  No valid reason has been offered to justify depar-
ture from the rule as set out in McKennon.
B. Adoption of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
In Lewis v. Fisher Service Co.,38 the South Carolina Supreme
Court addressed in some detail the abuses that could be associated
with use of after-acquired evidence by employers in employment
litigation.  The concerns expressed by the court were similar to
those expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Brogdon.  The
South Carolina court wrote, “If free reign were given, then in de-
fending breach of employment contract actions, less-than-
principled employers (or their attorneys) may be tempted to ‘rum-
mage the file’ in order to ‘discover’ any and all evidence that would
permit them to escape liability.”39  To address the dangers of al-
36. Id. at 385-86.  See also Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.2d 308, 312
(Tex. 1997) (adopting the after-acquired evidence doctrine as a limitation on an
employee’s recovery for a retaliatory discharge claim rather than as a basis for
dismissing the claim).
37. Fisher, supra note 1, at 290.
38. 495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998).
39. Id. at 445.
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lowing employers unrestricted use of after-acquired evidence, the
court imposed two limitations on use of such evidence.40  First, the
court adopted the McKennon standard requiring the employer to
prove that the misconduct was of “such severity that the employee
in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the
employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.”41  Second,
the court held that “this proof must be established, not by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evi-
dence.”42  The court went on to express its belief “that these two
limitations [would] serve to exclude doubtful or insignificant evi-
dence of employee wrongdoing, while allowing evidence of very
severe wrongdoing that should properly be considered.”43
In addition to application of the McKennon standard con-
cerning the severity of misconduct, the “clear and convincing evi-
dence” standard adopted by the court in Lewis should be adopted
for consideration of after-acquired evidence in Alaska.  The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized that justifications associated with
the presentation of after-acquired evidence “should be viewed with
skepticism.”44  The Court has even suggested that “a heightened
burden of proof” might be appropriate in considering after-
acquired evidence claims by employers.45  Given this suggestion, as
well as the skepticism expressed by the Court concerning after-
acquired evidence claims, the imposition of a “clear and convincing
evidence” standard to such claims would be consistent with the
opinion in Brogdon and would assist in addressing the concerns
expressed in that decision.46
C. Barring Evidence of Post-Termination Misconduct
The Model proposes that employers should be allowed to in-
troduce evidence of post-termination misconduct under the theory
that “such misconduct directly relates to an employee’s potential
40. See id.
41. Id. (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-
63 (1995)), quoted in Baber v. Greenville County, 488 S.E.2d 314, 320 (S.C. 1997).
42. Baber, 488 S.E.2d at 320.
43. Id.
44. Brogdon, 930 P.2d at 992.
45. Id.
46. Under Alaska law, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard is applied
in several situations where extraordinary claims are made, including those for pu-
nitive damages, ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (LEXIS 2000), and for relief from
liquidated damages and attorney’s fees in wage and hour actions, see id. §
23.10.110.
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remedies.”47  It is unclear how such evidence could be relevant to
any determination associated with the after-acquired evidence rule.
The question to be addressed with respect to the rule is whether
the employer would have dismissed the employee for violation of
company policies during employment.  Post-employment miscon-
duct, by definition, does not involve conduct by the employee dur-
ing employment.  If the misconduct did not take place during em-
ployment, employers cannot claim that an employee would have
been terminated earlier had the employer been aware of the mis-
conduct.
Courts that have examined this issue have held uniformly that
so-called “after after-acquired evidence” may not be admitted to
limit damages in employment cases.  In Carr v. Woodbury County
Juvenile Detention Center,48 cited by the Model’s author, the court
clearly rejected such evidence:
County policies governing employment simply cannot properly,
by which I mean either legally or equitably, be imposed upon a
person after his or her employment has been terminated.  It
would be grossly inequitable to hold Carr to all of the burdens of
County policies at a time when she is not receiving any of the
benefits of County employment.49
In Miller v. AT&T,50 the court held that a determination made after
dismissal regarding the propriety of absences could not be offered
as after-acquired evidence, because “[a]fter an employee has been
terminated, there is no legitimate purpose in continuing to evaluate
the employee.  The only purpose behind post-termination, piece
meal determinations regarding an employee’s conduct, is to limit
the damages of the employer in the event of an employment law-
suit.”51  The court argued that the after-acquired evidence rule “is
not intended to be used as a fishing expedition by employers to
find wrongful conduct on the part of their terminated employees
for the purpose of limiting their damages.”52  In Ryder v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,53 the court noted, in rejecting evidence of
post-employment misconduct, that the definition of after-acquired
evidence
presupposes that there was an employer-employee relationship
at the time that the misconduct occurred, i.e. that the employee
had not yet been terminated.  Moreover, there cannot be mis-
47. Fisher, supra note 1, at 295.
48. 905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
49. Id. at 629.
50. 83 F. Supp. 2d 700 (S.D. W. Va. 2000).
51. Id. at 705.
52. Id. at 706.
53. 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
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conduct that the employer did not know about prior to making
its adverse decision if the misconduct did not even occur until af-
ter the adverse decision was made.54
The purpose to be served by invoking the after-acquired evi-
dence rule should be a limited one.  Employers should not be
granted license, by the rule, to monitor employee behavior after
employment with the goal of finding some act or omission as a rea-
son that they would have terminated the employee, had the em-
ployee remained employed.  No court has allowed such use of af-
ter-acquired evidence.  In light of the concerns the court has
already expressed about potential abuse of the rule, the Alaska Su-
preme Court should not and likely will not become the first juris-
diction to do so.
V.  CONCLUSION
Any approach adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court to the
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine should address
the concerns expressed in Brogdon regarding the rule.  The test set
out in McKennon, which was cited by the court in Brogdon as the
seminal case on the use of after-acquired evidence, would address
those concerns.  Under that test, employers would be required to
establish that the employee misconduct at issue “was of such se-
verity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of
discharge.”55  The Brogdon court’s concerns would further be ad-
dressed by imposing a requirement that there be “clear and con-
vincing evidence” in support of the defense.  The approach sug-
gested in the Model, including allowing for introduction of post-
termination misconduct as after-acquired evidence, would open the
door to a multitude of abuses by employers in employment litiga-
tion and would not reflect the current state of the law in Alaska, as
set out in Brogdon and McKennon.
54. Id. at 537.
55. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995).
